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In an Article published in the May 2010 issue of the Business Lawyer, we 
examined Delaware doctrine and presented new evidence to conclude that the 
empirical  claim  that  the  federal  courts  relied  upon  to  uphold  Delaware’s 
antitakeover statute against Supremacy Clause challenges is no longer valid, and 
that the constitutionality of Section 203 is therefore “up for grabs.”  In this brief 
Reply,  we  respond  to  five  commentaries  on  our  Article,  written  by  prominent 
corporate law practitioners and academics.  Among other points, we re-examine 
the  sample that supported the constitutionality of Section 203 (n=17) to find that 
not a single one of these bids actually gave bidders a “meaningful opportunity for 
success” on a hostile basis, as the federal courts held that the Supremacy Clause 
requires.  Taken together, these further findings confirm our view that Section 203 
is vulnerable to constitutional attack. 
 
 
                                                            
* Harvard University, Analysis Group, & Analysis Group, respectively. The authors thank the 
corporate lunch group at Harvard Law School for helpful discussions and Nithya Sharma for 
excellent research assistance.  
 
 
DELAWARE’S ANTITAKEOVER STATUTE – ANALYSIS AND REPLY 
 
2 
In our main Article published in this issue,
1 we make three straightforward 
points: 
 
1.   Three  federal  district  courts h e l d  i n  1 9 8 8  t h a t  D e l a w a r e ’ s  
antitakeover  statute  must  give  bidders  a  “meaningful 
opportunity  for  success”  in  order  to  be  valid  under  the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
2  
 2. These three courts upheld Section 203 because the empirical 
evidence available at the time appeared to show that bidders 
were  able  to  achieve  an  85%  tender  on  a  hostile  basis 
reasonably often, but these courts left open the possibility that 
future  empirical  evidence  could  change  this  constitutional 
conclusion.
3  
 3. No bidder in the past nineteen years has been able to achieve 
85% in a hostile tender offer against a Delaware target.
4  
 
We conclude from these points that:  
 
[T]he empirical claim that the federal courts have relied upon 
to uphold Section 203’s constitutionality is no longer valid. It 
seems  possible  that  the  federal  courts  would  uphold  the 
constitutionality of Section 203 on different grounds. But at the 
very least the constitutionality of Section 203 would seem to be 
up for grabs.
5 
 
We thank The Business Lawyer for soliciting five excellent commentaries on 
our  Article.  The  commentators  are  all  well-known  and  well-respected 
practitioners and academics, and at least two of them were involved in the debates 
that led to the passage of Section 203 in 1988: Gil Sparks was the chairman of the 
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association at the time, and Gregg 
Jarrell was a vocal opponent of the legislation as it went through the Delaware 
legislature. We thank all the commentators for their insights. 
Some  commentators,  inside  this  issue  and  elsewhere,  agree  with  our  core 
conclusion noted above. Professor Joe Grundfest of Stanford Law School states, 
“Lawyers now have the data they need to renew a constitutional battle over these 
                                                            
1 Guhan Subramanian, Steven Herscovici & Brian Barbetta, Is Delaware’s Antitakeover Statute 
Unconstitutional? Evidence from 1988–2008, 65 BUS. LAW. __ (2010) [hereinafter SHB]. 
2 Id. at __. 
3 Id. at __. 
4 Id. at __. 
5 Id. at __.  
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sorts of state takeover laws.”
6 Professor Steve Bainbridge of UCLA Law School 
writes, “I agree that the article’s data calls into question the empirical grounding 
of the Delaware trilogy. To that extent, I agree that the validity of the Delaware 
statute  could  be  challenged.”
7 R i c h a r d  H a l l ,  a  p a r t n e r  at  Cravath,  Swaine  & 
Moore offers, “Almost no one gets an 85% vote on anything that is opposed by 
management.  If  that’s  the  factual  underpinning  for  203,  then  [Subramanian, 
Herscovici  &  Barbetta a r e ]  p r o b a b l y  r i g h t . ”
8 A n d  P r o f e s s o r  G r e g g  J a r r e l l ,  
formerly the Chief Economist at the SEC, notes in this issue, “Now, nearly twenty 
years later, the jury is in. Apparently, Section 203 has made it virtually impossible 
for a hostile bidder to succeed without first convincing target management to 
embrace its offer.”
9 Jarrell also presents interesting data showing a significant 
decline in hostile activity after the enactment of Section 203.
10 
Skadden  Arps  partner  Eileen  Nugent  adds  an  important  Wall  Street 
perspective to the discussion. We agree with her introductory point that lawyers in 
1988  probably  understood  the  contours  of  Section  203’s  constitutionality,  but 
over time these nuances have been forgotten and all that is left is the bottom-line 
conclusion.
11 As Nugent points out, “[I]t always  makes  sense  to  go  back  and 
review  the  premise  underlying  an  accepted  approach,  particularly  when  that 
reliance is of long standing and somewhat unquestioning.”
12 We also endorse her 
proposal that the Delaware legislature might consider clarifying that the 85% out 
should be assessed after any subsequent offering period in a tender offer.
13 
Others are more critical of our Article. As a starting point in assessing these 
claims, it is important to note that, with one potential caveat,
14 none of our critics 
                                                            
6 P e t e r  L a t t m a n ,  P o s t i n g  t o  Wall  Street  Journal D e a l  J o u r n a l  B l o g ,  http://blogs.wsj. 
com/deals/2009/09/24/with-hostiles-on-the-rise-a-delaware-antitakeover-law-comes-under-
scrutiny/ (Sept. 24, 2009, 11:35 AM EST) (“New Hostility for an Old Delaware Antitakeover 
Law”). 
7 h t t p : / / w w w . p r o f e s s o r b a i n b r i d g e . c o m / p r o f e s s o r b a i n b r i d g e c o m / 2 0 0 9 / 1 1 / s u b m a r a n i a n - r e p l i e s - r e -
delaware-203-constitutionality.html  (Nov. 19,  2009,  1:22  AM  EST) (“Subramanian  Replies  re 
Delaware 203 Constitutionality”). Like Professor Ribstein, Professor Bainbridge believes that a 
future court would nevertheless endorse the Amanda Acquisition approach. See id. 
8 David Marcus, Subramanian and Wachtell Square Off, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, Dec. 2009, at 
26, 26. 
9 Gregg A. Jarrell, A Trip Down Memory Lane: Reflections on Section 203 and Subramanian, 
Herscovici, and Barbetta, 65 BUS. LAW. ___,____ (2010). 
10 Id. at ___. 
11 Eileen T. Nugent, A Closer Look at DGCL Section 203, 65 BUS. LAW. ___, ___ (2010). 
12 Id. at ___. 
13 See id. at ___. 
14 Steve Lamb and Jeff Gorris implicitly challenge our first point summarized above, arguing that 
the “meaningful opportunity for success” test comes from BNS, the first case in the Delaware 
trilogy, and that “later opinions [Staley and Interco] addressed the issue in a much more nuanced 
manner.” Stephen P. Lamb & Jeffrey M. Gorris, A Practical Response to a Hypothetical Analysis  
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question the three basic points that are summarized above. Instead, our critics 
speculate  about  how  a  future  court  might  reconcile  our  experience  under  the 
statute with the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Gil Sparks and Helen 
Bowers  argue  that  the  friendly  deal  “out”  would  satisfy  the  constitutional 
requirement.
15 Professor Larry Ribstein argues that fiduciary duty constraints on 
Section 203 would satisfy the constitutional requirement  or, alternatively, that 
federal courts should and would rework their Supremacy Clause jurisprudence to 
accommodate  Section  203.
16 S t e v e  L a m b  a n d  J e f f r e y  G o r r i s  a r g u e  t h a t  “ t h e  
viability  of  the  meaningful  opportunity  for  success  test  is  less  than  certain” 
because of decisions in the Seventh and Fourth Circuits rejecting the test.
17 Some 
argue that our experience under the statute over the past twenty years should be 
ignored because of the solidification of the poison pill.
18  
                                                                                                                                                                  
of Section 203’s Constitutionality, 65 BUS. LAW. ___, ___ (2010) . While Lamb and Gorris are 
correct that the Staley and Interco courts discussed certain nuances in dicta, these courts squarely 
endorsed the “meaningful opportunity for success” test established in BNS. See RP Acquisition 
Corp. v. Staley Cont’l, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476,  482 (D. Del. 1988) (“The crucial inquiry . . . is 
whether hostile offers still have a meaningful opportunity for success . . . .”); City Capital Assocs. 
Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1551, 1555 (D. Del. 1988) (“This Court is persuaded that 
the analysis and rationale applied in those prior cases [BNS and Staley] with regard to the Williams 
Act  preemption  claims  and  the  Commerce  Clause  claims  were  correct  and  thus  adopts  them 
here.”). See also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 508 (7th Cir. 
1989) (“The three district judges who have considered and sustained Delaware’s law delaying 
mergers did so in large measure because they believed that the law left hostile offers ‘a meaningful 
opportunity for success.’”). 
15 See A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Helen Bowers, After  Twenty-Two  Years, Section 203  of  the 
Delaware General Corporation Law Continues to Give Hostile Bidders a Meaningful Opportunity 
for Success, 65 BUS. LAW. ___, ___ (2010) (presenting extensive data showing that hostile bids are 
sometimes completed as friendly deals). Sparks and Bowers assert that our exclusion of deals that 
turned friendly before the expiration of the initial tender offer is a “sleight-of-hand.” See id. at 
___. In fact, we discuss this methodological point extensively in our Article. See SHB, supra note 
1, at ___. In a similar mode of attack, Sparks and Bowers assert that our recommendation for a 
70% out “appears to have been selected from pure air.” See Sparks & Bowers, supra, at ___. In 
fact, we explain our reasons for this proposed threshold in our Article. See SHB, supra note 1, at 
___. 
16 See Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption as Micromanagement, 65 BUS. LAW. ___ (2010). 
17 See Lamb & Gorris, supra note 14, at ___. The fact that practitioners cite the Delaware trilogy 
as if these cases are good law is inconsistent with Lamb and Gorris’s claim. See, e.g., MARTIN 
LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 5.03[2][c][ii][a] (Supp. 2009) 
(noting the cases in the Delaware trilogy as if they are good law); ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & 
ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE § 4. 05 [ A]  ( 20 0 4)  (sa m e ). I n a ny  e ve nt ,  i f t he  
Delaware trilogy is in fact no longer good law, that conclusion only serves to prove our point that 
the constitutionality of Section 203 is “in play.” 
18 See Lamb & Gorris, supra note 14, at ___; Sparks & Bowers, supra note 15, at ___.  
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We assess these arguments in our original Article,
19 so we will not repeat 
those points here. Instead, we address four new possibilities that have been raised 
in this Symposium. 
First,  Professor  Ribstein  argues  that  “[i]t  would  be  inconsistent  with  [the 
Delaware trilogy’s] reliance on the legislature’s judgment to invalidate the statute 
based on circumstances arising after the legislature had applied its judgment.”
20 
We  know  of  no  principle  in  constitutional  law,  nor  does  Ribstein  offer  one, 
suggesting  that  when  the  legislature  makes  a  constitutional  assessment,  and  a 
court  later  acknowledges  that  assessment,  the  constitutional  question  becomes 
untouchable.  Ribstein  states  that  courts “ d i d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n t e m p l a t e  t h a t  
plaintiffs  could  return  to  court  more  than  a  generation  after  the  [Delaware 
trilogy],”
21 but this is precisely what the Delaware trilogy envisioned.
22 It should 
be remembered that Delaware passed its first antitakeover statute in 1976 and 
took  it  off  the  books  in  1987  because  it  was  likely  unconstitutional.  It  is  not 
obvious  why  Ribstein’s  hypothesized  statute  of  limitations  on  constitutional 
claims should run longer than eleven years but shorter than twenty-two.  
Lamb and Gorris challenge our argument that the pill has been weakened in 
recent years, arguing that the constitutionality of Section 203 is irrelevant because 
the pill is the binding constraint in hostile takeovers.
23 In fact, the most recent 
evidence suggests that we understated the decline of the pill. In an article entitled 
US Takeover Defences Come Tumbling Down, the Financial Times reports that 
only 28% of S&P 1500 companies had pills in 2009, a continued decline from the 
                                                            
19 See SHB, supra note 1, at ___. 
20 Ribstein, supra note 16, at ___. 
21 Id. at ___. 
22 See SHB, supra note 1, at ___ (citing relevant cases). Professor Ribstein also states that “SHB 
suggest that the poison pill itself avoids preemption.” Ribstein, supra note 16, at ___. We do not 
suggest this in our Article; therefore the “attempted distinction” between Section 203 and the pill 
that Ribstein criticizes, id. at ___, is not a distinction that we try to make. Ribstein then criticizes 
our Section 203 analysis because (he argues) if it were correct it would call into question defenses 
of unquestioned constitutional validity, such as the staggered board. See id. at ___. In fact, there is 
a natural distinction between transactional defenses, such as Section 203 and the pill, and other 
corporate governance provisions, such as the staggered board. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v Dynamics 
Corp.  of  Am.,  481  U.S.  69,  99  (1987)  (White,  J.,  dissenting)  (describing  the  “fundamental 
distinction”  between  transactional  defenses  such  as  the  Indiana  antitakeover  statute  and  other 
corporate governance provisions, such as cumulative voting and staggered boards). 
23 Lamb & Gorris, supra note 14, at ___. The argument is particularly interesting because Steve 
Lamb has previously expressed puzzlement about the Delaware Supreme Court’s endorsement of 
the flip-over pill in Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985). See 
A Household Name, M&A J.,____, 2006, at 15, 20 (“Looking back on the Household fight, Mr. 
Lamb was still wondering how it could be that the directors of one company can be allowed [to] 
send their own shareholders to plunder the stock of another company at a discounted price that 
they unilaterally determine in advance. He rolled his eyes and smiled: ‘I just don’t know.’”).  
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54% incidence in 2005 and 37.5% incidence in 2007 that we reported in our 
original Article.
24 Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, the inventor of the poison pill, 
nevertheless points to the recent decision in Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises, 
Inc.
25 a s  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  t h e  p i l l  i s  a l i v e  a n d  w e l l .
26 I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  D e l a w a r e  
Chancery  Court  upheld  the  use  of  a  pill t o  p r o t e c t  a  t a r g et  company’s  net 
operating losses (NOLs).
27 However, pill doctrine is only relevant for companies 
that have pills, and nearly three-quarters of major U.S. companies currently do 
not.
28 More important, Selectica focuses on the ability of a board to use a pill once 
a threat has been identified (in that case, the loss of NOLs). Selectica does not 
change the fact that the board must identify a threat before being able to take 
defensive measures.  
Next, Sparks and Bowers argue that the “the Jarrell analyses . . . remain the 
only direct evidence of the ability . . . to achieve the 85% threshold.”
29 Since 
submitting the final version of our Article to The Business Lawyer, we have had 
an opportunity to examine the data that Sparks and Bowers rely upon in their 
constitutional assessment.
30 Out of the thirty-one deals in Professor Jarrell’s final 
sample that are classified as beginning and ending hostile, seventeen reached the 
85% threshold.
31 This 55% success rate for hostile bidders was the statistic that 
the Interco and Staley courts used to conclude that Section 203 gives bidders a 
“meaningful opportunity for success.”
32  
                                                            
24 Helen Thomas, US Takeover Defences Come Tumbling Down, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2010, at 14 
(citing latest statistics from RiskMetrics). 
25 C.A. No. 4241-VCN, 2010 WL 703062 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2010). 
26 See Theodore N. Mervis, Eric S. Robinson, William Savitt & Ryan McLeod, Delaware Upholds 
4.99% Rights Plan to Protect NOLs (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, N.Y.),  Mar. 1, 
2010, at 2 (on file with The Business Lawyer) (“The [Selectica] decision constitutes a powerful 
rejoinder to those who have claimed that the pill has been weakened in recent years by newly 
emerging fiduciary constraints . . . .”). But see Posting by Steve M. Davidoff to New York Times 
DealBook Blog, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/02/delaware-broadens-standards-for-
poison-pills/#more-187323  (Mar.  2,  2010,  1:31 PM  EST)  (“Delaware  Broadens  Standards  for 
Poison Pills”) (arguing that Wachtell’s statement “ignores the structure of our capital markets and 
the role of activist shareholders and proxy contests”). 
27 Selectica, 2010 WL 703062, at *25. 
28 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Although companies continue to have the legal 
ability to put in a pill after a bid is launched, we believe that the decline in pill incidence is 
meaningful for reasons that we describe in our Article. See SHB, supra note 1, at ___ & n.__. 
29 See Sparks & Bowers, supra note 15, at ___. 
30 We thank Professor Gregg Jarrell for making this data available to us. 
31 See Affidavit of Dr. Gregg A. Jarrell at 13, City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc., 696 
F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del. 1988) (Civ. A. No. 88-424 (JJF)) [hereinafter Jarrell Interco Affidavit]. 
32 See RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Cont’l, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 482–83 (D. Del. 1988) (“55 
percent  (16  out  of  29)  of  the  hostile  tender  offers  reached  85  percent  share  holdings.  .  .  . 
Interpreting the same information as Dr. Jarrell did, the S.E.C. concludes at most 50 percent (13 
out  of  26)  of  the  hostile  tender  offers  reached 8 5  p e r c e n t  s h a r e  h o l d i n g s .  T h e s e  p e r c e n t a g e s   
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Table 1 provides a breakdown of the seventeen successful bids in Professor 
Jarrell’s sample. It shows that five bidders already held significantly more than 
15% at the time of the tender offer, which means that these bids would not have 
qualified for the 85% out.
33 It is not surprising that these bidders were able to 
achieve 85% because they had virtual control (32–49%) before initiating their 
tender offers. Two bids were competing offers, and so also would not have been 
subject to Section 203.
34 Four bids were friendly from the outset and three more 
were approved by the target board prior to reaching the 85% hurdle, so all seven 
were incorrectly coded as hostile-to-the-end offers.
35 In the three remaining bids, 
the target boards were formally neutral or remained passive on the offer, and so 
these bids were also not hostile in the traditional sense.
36  
                                                                                                                                                                  
undercut plaintiff’s own argument and indicate hostile offers will have a ‘meaningful opportunity 
for success’ under the 85 percent exception.”); Interco, 696 F. Supp. at 1555 (noting “updated 
version”  of  statistics  presented  in  Staley b u t  c o n c l u d i n g  t h a t  t h e  d a t a  “ h a s  n o t  c h a n g e d  
significantly”). 
33 Professor Jarrell notes the same point in his reports, see, e.g., Jarrell Interco Affidavit, supra 
note 32, at 13, but this quite reasonable basis for exclusion was ignored by the Staley and Interco 
courts. 
34 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(6) (2001) (exempting offers against target companies that 
have previously signed a merger agreement with a third party). Even if these two bids were not 
exempted from Section 203 as a formal matter, they do not provide evidence on the viability of the 
85%  out  because  the  tender  decision  is  significantly  different  in  an  end-game  situation  with 
competing bidders. In the famous bidding contest for Revlon, for example, after the Delaware 
Supreme Court concluded that the sale of the company was “inevitable” and enjoined the Revlon 
board’s  defensive  mechanisms  that  thwarted  an  auction,  92%  of  Revlon  shareholders 
unsurprisingly chose Perelman’s $58 cash per share when the alternative was Forstmann Little’s 
$57.25 cash. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 
1986). Additionally, in Atlantic Oil, the board reversed its stance against the Stephens tender offer 
and stated that the revised offer represented “an acceptable price.” See Stephens Unit Raises Bid 
for Atlantic Oil to $12 a Share, DOW JONES NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 21, 1983. 
35 In six of these bids, the incumbent board approved the offer. In the seventh bid (R&R Metal’s 
tender offer for Vulcan Packaging), R&R replaced the incumbent board with its own nominees on 
June 28, 1988, see George Brett, Gracious in Defeat, Cavan Leaves Vulcan, TORONTO STAR, June 
29, 1988, at B1, and closed its tender offer for 87.9% of the Vulcan shares on July 19. 
36 Among these three, the Mesa Royalty Trust bid was closer to friendly than neutral. The deal 
involved a repurchase of a spinoff from Mesa Petroleum, T. Boone Pickens’s acquisition vehicle. 
Pickens told the press: “It’s such a nice deal; we can acquire this without making anybody’s 
management mad at us.” Charles F. McCoy, Mesa Seeks to Repurchase Royalty Trust at $35 a 
Unit as Pickens Reverses Stance, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1984, at 1. Thomson Financial also codes 
the Mesa Royalty deal as “Friendly.” In Citicorp’s bid for Quotron Systems, Quotron Chairman 
Milton E. Mohr said that although the board believed the price was inadequate, “[i]t would not be 
in the shareholders’ interest for the company to take actions which might prevent the Quotron 
shareholders  from  making  their  own  determinations  as  to  the  adequacy  of  the  offer  and  the 
desirability of tendering their stock for $19 a share.” See Bill Sing, Quotron Says It Won’t Fight 
Citicorp Bid, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1986, at 3. According to analysts, “[a] Quotron decision not to 
oppose Citicorp was likely to guarantee that the offer would succeed.” Id. In the third bid in this  
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This analysis leads to a striking conclusion: not a single bid that the federal 
district  courts  relied  upon  to  conclude  that  the  85%  out  gives  bidders  a 
“meaningful opportunity for success” on a hostile basis actually stands for that 
proposition. If this is the evidence that Sparks and Bowers wish to rely upon, 
Section 203 would seem to be on shaky constitutional footing.  
Finally, Lamb and Gorris suggest that a future court would only look at the 
data  from  1988–1989  to  determine  whether  Section  203  gives  bidders  a 
“meaningful opportunity for success.”
37 Among the various arguments that have 
been  put  forward,  we  believe  that  this i s  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  a r g u m e n t  t h a t  w o u l d  
reconcile the doctrine with the data. But the important point is this: none of these 
arguments, including the Lamb and Gorris argument, have been endorsed by any 
court.  Our  critics  over-read  our  Article  to  claim  that  the  data  mandates 
unconstitutionality, when all we say is that the data refutes the empirical claim 
that has until now supported constitutionality. The fact that critics of our Article 
speculate about what a court might do to find Section 203 constitutional proves 
our point that the constitutionality of Section 203 is “in play.” 
 
An Illustration 
To  see  this  point  more  precisely,  consider  an  all-cash,  any-and-all,  fully 
financed hostile takeover bid for a Delaware company that has not opted out of 
Section 203. To make the bidder’s legal position stronger (though the hypothetical 
does  not  turn  on  this  fact),  assume  that  the  target  has  a  large  non-officer 
shareholder (like David Duffield at PeopleSoft), thereby making the effective bar 
for  utilizing  the  85%  out  something  like  95%.  The  bidder  challenges  the 
constitutionality of Section 203 in federal district court. The target responds that 
the constitutionality of Section 203 is well-settled law, citing the Koppers, Staley, 
and  Interco t r i l o g y .
38 A s  N u g e n t  d e s c r i b e s ,  a  w e l l - c o u n s e l e d  b i d d e r  w o u l d  
respond that these cases relied on an empirical proposition that is no longer valid, 
if it ever was.
39 With this straightforward and uncontested point, the court would 
be in open terrain. 
The court hearing the case would first have to determine the appropriate test 
under the Supremacy Clause. The court might endorse the Amanda Acquisition 
approach,  which  essentially  imposes  no  Supremacy  Clause  constraint  on  state 
                                                                                                                                                                  
category  (Cannon  Mills),  the  target  board  was  formally  neutral.  See  Cannon  Mills  ‘Remains 
Neutral’ on Takeover Offer, DOW JONES NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 20, 1982. 
37 See Lamb & Gorris, supra note 14, at ___. 
38 See BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley 
Cont’l, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc., 696 
F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del. 1988). 
39 See Nugent, supra note 11, at ___.  
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regulation of takeovers.
40 Alternatively, the court might follow the three prior 
district  court  judges  who  examined  Section  203  to  endorse  the  “meaningful 
opportunity for success” test.
41 For reasons described in our Article, we believe 
that  the  latter  approach  is  more  likely,  but  the  important  point  is  that  neither 
choice is mandated by existing law. 
If  the  court  endorses  the  “meaningful o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  s u c c e s s ”  t e s t ,  t h e  
question becomes: does Section 203 give bidders a meaningful opportunity for 
success? The court might hold that some combination of the friendly deal “out” 
and  fiduciary  duty  constraints  on  Section  203  give  bidders  a  meaningful 
opportunity for success, although, as we point out in our Article, either of these 
reconciliations would be inconsistent with the Delaware trilogy’s emphasis on the 
viability of the 85% out as well as other Delaware precedent.
42 Alternatively, the 
court might operate within the framework set out by the Delaware trilogy to hold 
that the constitutionality of Section 203 turns on the viability of the 85% out. 
Again, neither approach is mandated by existing law. 
If the court chooses to operate within the framework set out by the Delaware 
trilogy,  the  court  must  then  decide  whether  the  85%  out  gives  bidders  a 
meaningful opportunity for success. On this question, we highlight an important 
shift in the debate since 1988. Today, no one argues that achieving 85% on a 
hostile basis is easy, as observers claimed back then.
43 Instead, the debate today is 
whether getting to 85% is “difficult” or “close to impossible.” How might a court 
resolve this question? One possibility would be to look at the evidence that we 
offer from the past twenty years. A second possibility would be to examine only 
the evidence from 1988–1989, as Lamb and Gorris suggest. A third possibility, 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, would be to accept expert witness testimony 
from experienced practitioners on whether achieving 85% on a hostile basis is 
“difficult” or “close to impossible” today. Whatever approach the court takes, the 
constitutionality  of  Section  203  is  in  play.  And  of  course,  the  constitutional 
question  becomes  easier  to  answer  as  the  effective  hurdle  for  getting  to  85% 
becomes higher (say 95%), as posited in our hypothetical. 
 
The Likelihood of Reform 
In his commentary, Professor Jarrell warns us against “getting too emotionally 
invested in [our] efforts to alter Section 203” because such efforts are “doomed to 
                                                            
40 See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989). 
41 See Koppers, 683 F. Supp. at 469; Staley, 686 F. Supp. at 482; Interco, 696 F. Supp. at 1555. 
42 See SHB, supra note 1, at ___ & n.___. 
43 See id. at ___.  
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fail.”
44 W e  w i s h  t o  b e  c l e a r  t h a t  w e  are  making  a  doctrinal  and  empirical 
argument, not engaging in an emotional crusade. In fact, we take no position in 
our Article as to whether the elimination of Section 203 would be good or bad as 
a policy matter. As to whether our point is “doomed to fail,” we acknowledge that 
there  are  powerful  vested  interests,  in  Delaware  and  elsewhere,  for  keeping 
Section 203 in place. However, we also believe that Delaware corporate law is at 
an  interesting  and  unprecedented  moment.  Congress  has  already  federalized 
significant aspects of corporate law with the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act  of  2008,
45 t h e  A m e r i c a n  R e i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  R e c o v e r y  A c t  o f  2 0 0 9 ,
46 a n d  
(going back) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
47 The Dodd bill and the Schumer 
bill  currently  pending  in  Congress  would  go  even  further.
48 T h e  S E C ’ s  
shareholder  access  proposal,
49 t h e  w a v e  o f  m a j o r i t y  voting  proposals,  and  the 
NYSE’s  policy  change  on  broker  voting  of  discretionary  shares
50 a r e  a l l  
manifestations of the belief that boards need to be more responsive to shareholder 
interests. Hostile bidders are no longer the pariahs that they were in the 1980s. 
And finally, although we are not experts in the intricacies of U.S. Supreme Court 
politics, we note that only two Justices who decided CTS are still on the Court, 
with  one  of  them  (Scalia)  siding  with  the  majority
51 a n d  t h e  o t h e r  ( S t e v e n s )  
joining a three-Justice dissent on the preemption claim.
52 
In  this  environment,  we  believe  that  the  Delaware  legislature  should 
reconsider  whether  it  wishes  to  offer  such  substantial  insulation  from  hostile 
                                                            
44 See Jarrell, supra note 9, at ___. 
45 Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A.). 
46 Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections of 6, 19, 26, 42 & 47 U.S.C.A.). 
47 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 
U.S.C.). 
48 See Jim Kuhnhenn, Dodd Puts Wall Street in Washington’s Sights, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 16, 
2010,  http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35872652/ns/business-stocks_and_economy/  (discussing 
Dodd’s updated financial reform bill, unveiled in the Senate on March 15, 2010); Shareholder Bill 
of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009) (Schumer bill). 
49 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60089, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 29024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249 & 274). 
50 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, LLC, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-60215, 74 Fed. Reg. 33293, 33293 (July 10, 2009) (approving the NYSE’s proposal to 
amend  Rule  452  “to  eliminate  broker  discretionary  voting  for  all  elections  of  directors  at 
shareholder meetings held on or after January 1, 2010”). 
51 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia., J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
52 Id. at 98–99 (White, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is clear to me that Indiana’s scheme conflicts with the 
Williams Act’s careful balance, which was intended to protect individual investors and permit 
them to decide whether it is in their best interests to tender their stock. . . . The Control Share 
Acquisitions Chapter will effectively prevent minority shareholders in some circumstances from 
selling their stock to a willing tender offeror. It is the practical impact of the Chapter that leads to 
the conclusion that it is pre-empted by the Williams Act.”).  
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takeovers  as  a  matter  of  statutory  law.  We  also  continue  to  believe  that  if 
Delaware  does  not  reconsider  Section  203,  the  statute  is  vulnerable  to 
constitutional attack.  
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Table 1: Bids Relied Upon in Staley and Interco to Conclude that 
Bidders Have a “Meaningful Opportunity for Success” on a 
Hostile Basis 
 
Date Offer 
Began  Target  Bidder  Comments 
6/17/1981  Treadway Cos.  Fair Lanes Inc. 
Bidder owned 33.8% of outstanding 
shares prior to bid 
11/1/1982  Juniper Petroleum Corp.  Damson Oil Inc.  Bidder owned 49.3% prior to bid 
10/29/1984  Sonoma Vineyards  Renfield Corp.  Bidder owned 46.9% prior to bid 
8/22/1985  SCM Corp.  Hanson Trust PLC  Bidder owned 32.4% prior to bid 
1/7/1987  Booth Inc.  Household International Inc.  Bidder owned 44.8% prior to bid 
1/20/1983  Atlantic Oil Corp.  Stephens Inc.  Jump bid—Section 203 not applicable 
8/19/1985  Revlon Inc.  Pantry Pride Inc. J u m p   b i d — S e c t i o n   2 0 3   n o t   a p p l i c a b l e  
7/15/1981 
Connecticut General 
Mortgage & Realty 
Investment Trust 
Prudential Insurance Corp. of 
America  Friendly deal 
8/25/1981  Walter Realty Investors Inc.  Seville Corp.  Friendly deal 
11/15/1982 
National Mobil Concrete 
Corp.  Chaucer Alliance Inc.  Friendly deal 
11/18/1986  Guilford Industries Inc.  Debron Investments PLC  Friendly deal 
9/12/1983  Northwest Energy Co.  Williams Co. 
Board agreed to merger prior to 85% of 
shares being tendered 
12/23/1983  Rampac Inc.  Pan-American Properties Inc. 
Board agreed to merger prior to 85% of 
shares being tendered 
5/25/1988  Vulcan Packaging Inc.  R&R Metal Products Ltd. 
Board agreed to merger prior to 85% of 
shares being tendered 
1/5/1982  Cannon Mills Co.  Pacific Holding Co.  Target board neutral on offer 
5/18/1984  Mesa Royalty Trust  Mesa Petroleum Co.  Target board neutral on offer 
5/22/1986  Quotron Systems Inc.  Citicorp Inc. T a r g e t   b o a r d   r e m a i n e d   p a s s i v e   o n   o f f e r  
 